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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NORl\,1A LEE :MADSEN,
Plaintiff-Responilent,
-vs-

'\TALKER BANK & TRUST
COMP ANY, a corporation,

Case No.
12822

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE::\1ENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent
(hereinafter called :Miss :Madsen), against the Defendant Appellant bank (hereinafter referred to as the
Bank), for damages incurred by the Bank's negligence
in accepting and forwarding a $5,500.00 check without
an endorsement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Respondent agrees with the statement of the
Disposit'.on in the Lower Court set forth in the Appellant's Brief.

..,
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RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
The Respondent requests that the Judgment of
the Lower Court be affirmed.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The Plaintiff, Norma Lee :Madsen, had maintained both a savings and a checking account with the
Sugar house lhanch of the Defendant, '\Talker Bank
and Trust Company, continuously for approximately
twenty-five years prior to the filing of this action, and
the relationship between ~Iiss ~Iadsen and the Bank
had been satisfactory until the events giving rise to
this action. ( R. 169, 170) .

Prior to ~lay of 1969, ~liss ~Iadsen 1 o an e d
$5,000.00 to a Darrell G. llafen. (R. 173). From ~lay
1969 until December, 1969, ~Iiss :l\Iadsen attempted
unsuccessfully to collect this loan from ~Ir. Hafen,
during which time ~Ir. Ilafen gave ~Iiss ~Iadsen at
least hvo checks ·which were returned by the Banks
marked "Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed."
( R. 173, 174). 'Vhile .l\I iss ~Iadsen was attempting to
collect this obligation, she regularly conferred with
officials of the Sugarhouse Branch of the '\Talker Bank
and Trust Company regarding the matter, and at least '
three officers of the Bank-namely, ~Ir.John Doherty,
Assistant Vice-President and Branch :i\Ianager; Dale
Steadm:m, Assistant Cashier and Operations Officer
at the Sugarhouse Branch; and Colene Day - were 1
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personally aware of the difficulties which l\Iiss :Madsen
had in collecting this check. (R. 4a, 174-177, 181).
On December 4th, 1!)69, .Mr. Hafen gave l\Iiss
l\Iadsen a check in the amount of $5,500.00 drawn on
the account of Dixie :l\Iinerals and Water, Inc., at the
Draper Bank and Trust Company, informing her that
he had deposited sufficient monies to pay this check.
(R. 178) ..Miss .l\ladsen went immediately to the Sugarhouse Branch of the '1Valker Bank and Trust Company,
at which time she showed the check to one of the officers
of the Bank who had knowledge of the circumstances
smTotmding payment of this check, who, in turn, expressed satisfaction that :Miss .Madsen had been paid
and instructed her to have a t e 11 er call Draper
Bank and Trust Company to verify that the money
was in the account. (R. 178, 181, 182). The officer
gave .Miss :Madsen no instructions or indications that
she should take any actions other than to deposit the
check with '\Talker Bank. ( R. 182) . l\I iss l\Iadsen then
went to a teller's cage and deposited in her checking
account a number of other small checks which the teller
checked for endorsements before depositing. (R. 182183) . After this transaction was completed and the
small checks were processed, l\Iiss l\Iadsen presented the
teller with the check in question for deposit in her savings account and, in accordance with the Bank officer's
directions, requested that the teller call Draper Bank
and Trust Company to verify that there were sufficient
funds in that Bank to pay the subject check. (R. 183-

184). l\liss .l\ladsen had not endorsed the check at that
time pernling the confirmation from Draper Bank and
Trust Company because she did not want to make the
check a negotiable instrument until the check was
actually deposited. ( R. 180). The teller took the check
from .l\Iiss :Madsen's possession, left the teller's cage,
telephoned Draper Bank and Trust Company, in·
formed .l\Iiss ~Iadsen that the money was in the account,
and deposited the check in .Miss l\ladsen's savings account without ever returning the check to :l\Iiss l\Ia<lsen's possession or control for endorsement (R. 183186), and without supplying the Bank's substitute endorsement ("credited to the account of the within-named
payee"), which would ha\'e ensured payment of this
check. (R. 21, 259).
The check apparently was processed through
normal banking channels where it reached Draper Bank
and 'Trust Company on December 8th, HW9, (R. 230),
at which time there were sufficient funds in the account
to cover the check, and Draper Bank and Trust Com·
pany would indeed have paid the check if it had con·
tained either l\ I iss .l\ladsen' s endorsement or Walker
Bank's substitute endorsement. (R. 254-255, 2.59).
Draper Bank and Trust Company, however, returned
the check to lV alker Bank and Trust because there was
no endorsement. Upon return of the check, and with·
out notice to :Miss .l\Iadsen, '\Talker I~ank affixed its
substitute endorsement on the check and returned the
check through banking channels to Draper Bank and
Trust Company; however, prior to receipt of the check
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the second time by Draper Bank and Trnst, the account
on which the check was written was attached through
legal process by third parties. (R. 256). The check was
again returned to 'Valker Bank and Trust Company,
and the Bank reversed the credit in her savings account.
Although the subject check was deposited for collection with Walker Bank and Trust Company on December 4, 1969, .l\1iss :Madsen was never notified that any
problem existed with regard to the check until December 17, 19~. (R. 28, 186) .
.l\liss :Madsen brought an action against 'Valker
Bank and Trust Company and Draper Bank and Trust
Company to recover the amount of the check. The jury
at the trial found that Walker Bank was negligent in
accepting and forwarding the subject check without an
endorsement, and Judgment was rendered in favor of
Plaintiff.
'i\r ALKER BANK '1\7 AS NJ<~GLIGENT IN ITS

FAILURE TO HANDLE THE SUBJECT
CHECK 'VITH DUE CARE REQUIRED BY
THE UN IQ U E CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CHECK'S DEPOSIT AND
COLLECTION.
The circumstances surrounding the acceptance and
forwarding of the check which is the subject of this
action differ in the following ways from the procedures
utilized by Walker Bank in the processing and transf ering of virtually all other checks which pass through
the Bank:
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A. Unlike other checks, at least three of the officers of the Sugarhouse l3ranch of 'V alker Bank were
av.. are of circumstances regarding previous attempts
to collect the obligation owing by Darrell I-Iafen to the
Uespondent, including knowledge of circumstances
surrounding the attempted collection of earlier checks
and numerous discussions of these problems with :Miss
l\iadsen.
B. Unlike other checks, an officer of the Bank
who had knowledge of circumstances regarding the attempted collection of the obligation, discussed the collection of the subject check on the morning the check
was pl~ced with the Bank for collection.
C. Unlike other checks, this bank officer directed
.l\Iiss .1\Iadsen to ask a hank teller to cali Draper Bank
and Trust Company to verify that funds were in the
Bank, thus impliedly assuring :Miss :Madsen that the
Bank would use care in collecting the check.
D. Finally, unlike other checks, the Bank teller
telephoned Draper Bank & Trust Company to verify
that sufficient funds were in that llank to pay the check
prior to crediting the check to .l\liss :Madsen's Savings
Account.
l\Ir. John Doherty, the Assistant Vice-President
awl Assistant :l\lanager of the Sugarhouse llranch office of 'Valker Bank, testified at the trial that, while
more than 5,000 checks go through the Sugarhouse
Branch of \V alker Bank daily, not even on the average
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of once a day does an of ficcr of the Bank have occasion to talk with a person regarding problems surrounding the collecting of one particular check. ( R. 246248). l\loreover, .Mr. Doherty testified that it is not
the general practice of 'V alker Bank to telephone
another lhnk, when the check is placed for collection,
to yerify that the money is in the other bank. (R. 246247). Therefore, with respect to the subject check, the
Appellant and Respondent established a course of dealing which placed the transaction outside the usual coverage of the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah Code
Ann.§ 70A-l-205(1) (1953) provides that:
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous
conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding
for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct. See also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4204 ( l) (1953); Utah Code Ann. § 70Al-20(16) (1953); 1. Anderson's Uniform
Commercial Code, 1-205 :2, 3, 6.
Despite the Bank's knowledge of circumstances
surrounding the subject check, affirmative actions
which Bank officers and agents took in instructing l\Iiss
l\Iadsen regarding the procedure to follow in cashing
the check, and the Uank's knowledge of the necessity
of handling the check in a careful manner, the Bank
was negligent by allowing the check to leave the Bank
without Miss Madsen's endorsement or supplying its
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own substitute endorsement, although testimony at the
trial indicated that the teller had manually stamped the
llank's usual endorsement on the hack of the check.
(R. 219-222) ..l\Ioreover, when the check was returned
for lack of endorsement, the Bank then supplied its
substitute endorsement and sent the check back to
Draper Rank without informing Miss ·l\Iadsen of any
difficulties regarding the check, and l\Iiss l\Iadsen
never learned of any problems regarding the check until
thirteen days after it was initially deposited.
Despite the peculiarity of the circumstances surrounding the subject check, and the particular knowledge and actions of officers of "\V alker l3:mk with respect to that check, the Appellant argues that l\liss
l\ladsen cannot recover her damages resulting from the
Bank's negligence, but that the Uniform Commercial
Cocle pre-empts the area of commercial paper and precludes recovery in this case. It is clear, however, from
an examination of the Uniform Commercial Code that
the Uank cannot plead a defense based upon the protection which the lJ ni form Commercial Code provides to
Uanks with regard to checks which are handled with
reasonable care and in the ordinary course of business.
llather, the Code provides its protection only in those
circumstances in which the Code's provisions have been
followed by the lhnk and when the Bank has not violated its duty to use reasonable care. Even the Appellant acknowledges, on page 11 of its Brief, that some
circumstances may require more than ordinary care for
a particular check, and the jury obviously found that
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such a circumstance existed in this case. Under the Uniform Commercial Code a bank ordinarily may supply
a substitute endorsement in lieu of the customer's endorsement. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-205 (1953}.
'iVhile this ordinarily does not require the Bank to
supply a missing endorsement, the jury determined in
this case that the Bank had an affirmative duty either
to obtain .l\Iiss :Madsen's endorsement or to supply its
own endorsement because of the peculiarity of circumstances of the case.
Despite the Appellant's allegation that the jury
was not instructed with i·egard to specific provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the jury was provided with extensi,·e testimony regarding banking law
and procedures, Federal Reserve Operating Provisions,
Clearing House Rules, customs and usages of banks in
Utah, and the procedures of 'Valker Bank. Of the four
( 4) witnesses giving testimony at the trial, three ( 3}
were officers or employees of Defendant Banks, specifically: John Doherty, Assistant Vice-President and
Assistant .l\1 anager of the Sugarhouse Branch of
\Valker Bank (R. 217-218}; Richard Kieffer, Second
Vice-President and Coordinator of Operations of
'V alker Bank ( R. 269) ; Doyle Johnson, Cashier of
Draper Bank and Trust (R. 251); and Jolene Cowley,
the Teller who handled the subject for Walker Bank
and Trust Company. (R. 262-263}. Viitually all of
the testimony of these four ( 4) witnesses was concerned
with describing normal procedures for the handling of
checks, and the jury's determination of negligence re-
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suited from the fact that 'Valker Bank complied only
with ordinary procedures in this case rather than using
the degree of care required under the circumstances.
The Uniform Commercial Code was established
to provide uniformity regarding commercial transactions, to facilitate the ease and certainty of commercial relationships, and to establish which party should
bear losses when the provisions of the Code have been
complied with. There is no question, however, that the
Code was not intended to replace all other existing
Utah law, including the law regarding negligence, with
a static definitive code. Rather, the Code is designed
for expansion and refinement of practices through new
customs, usages and mutual agreements of the parties.
Utah Crnle Ann. § 70A-l-102 ( l )-(3) (1953) provides:

( l) This act shall be liberally construed and
a pp lied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies.

( 2) Underlying purposes and policies of this
act are
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize
the law gm'crning commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
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( c) to make uniform the law among the
Yarious jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may
be Yaried by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
Official Code comment to Uniform Commercial
Code section 1-102 states.
Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to
make it clear that:
This act is drawn to provide flexibility so
that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent
piece of legislation, it will provide its own
machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the
law embodied in this Act to be developed by
the Courts in the light of unforeseen and new
circumstances and practices. However, the
proper construction of the Act requires that its
interpretation and application be limited to its
reason.

12

Courts lun-e been carcf ul to keep broad
acts from being hampered in their effccts by
later acts of' limited seope. They have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject matter which was
not expressly included in the language of the
act. They have done the same where reason and
policy so required, even where the subject matter had been intentionally excluded from the
Act in general. They have implemented a
statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text. They
ha\re disregarded a statutory limitat:on of
remedy where the reason of the limitation did
not apply. Nothing in this Act stands in the

wall of the continuance of such action by the
courts.
The Act should he construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and pol!cies.
The text of each section should be read in the
light of the purpose and policy of the rule or
principle in question, as also of the Act as a
whole, and the application of the language
should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the
case may be, in conformity with the purposes
and policies involved. (Citations omitted)
(Emphasis added) See also: 1 Anderson's
Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-102-3.
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It is also clear that a course of dealing between
parties can modify the Code's effect. The Code expressly directs that:
(3) A course of dealing between parties and
any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in
which they are engaged or of which they are
or should be aware give particular meaning to
and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
( 4) The express terms of an agreement and

applicable course of dealing or usage of trade
shall he construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control
both course of dealing and usage of trade and
course of dealing controls usage of trade.
( 5) An applicable usage of trade in the place
where any part of performance is to occur
shall be used in interpreting the agreement as
to that part of the performance. Utah Code
Ann.§ 70A-l-205(3)-(5) (1953).

It is also equally clear that supplementary general
principles of law are applicable and that remedies
should be liberally constmed. See Utah Code Ann. §
70A-l-103 (1953); Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-106
(1953); National Shmvm-ut llanlc of Boston v. Vera,
352 :Mass. 11, 223 N.E. 2d 515 {1967); Zab1'iskie Chev-
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rolct, Inc. ·u. ,\'mith, 99 X.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195
( 1968).

There are numerous references in the Code to various remedies available to a party, although the Code
does not specify what the remedies consist of. An example of this is regarding lost, destroyed or stolen instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-804 (1953), allows a party to bring an action to recover from any
party "liable" for the loss, hut the Code does not specify the manner of determining liability. :Moreover, Section 70A-l-201 (a) defines "action" as a "judicial proceeding [including] recoupmcnt counterclaim, set-off,
suit in equity and an!J other proceedings in which right.Y
are dcte.rmined." (Emphasis added). There is no question that the Code does not restrict a cause of action
solely to provisions of the Code unless the Code specifically provides the remedy.
'\Then a hank complies with the Code practices and
procedures, the lbnk can claim the protection provided
by the Code. liowever, if the Bank has modified ·its
usual procedures with regard to an item, as Walker
Bank did in this instance, the Ifank cannot, as a defense,
fall back on the arg\1ment that the check was handled
in a manner similar to every other check.
In the Appellant's brief, '"alker Bank argues that
the check handling procedures after the deposit with
'"alker Bank were in accordance with applicable regulations and customs for handling of the check in Utah.
The Respondent does not contend that the check was
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handled other than in the ordinary course of business
af fer it left the teller's cage. The critical point, however,
which the Bank ignores is that the check, prior to its
leaving the Sugarhouse Branch, was handled in a unique
and peculiar manner, vastly different from virtually
every other check which goes through the banking procedures.
Clearly, then, under Utah Law, the existence of
the Uniform Commercial Code does not preclude a recovery against a bank on a theory of negligence. In the
case of First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Ezra C.
Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454, P.2d 886 (1969),
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision allowing a plaintiff bank to charge back a check
against the defendants' account, among other reasons
on the basis that the jury found that the bank was negligent for failure to notify the depositors of the dishonor of a check. In this case, the bank was equally
negligent by allowing the check to leave the bank without an endorsement, by attempting to rectify its oversight through subsequent attaching of its endorsement
without notifying :Miss l\Ia<lsen of the first dishonor
of the check, and by failing to notify .Miss .l\laclsen of
difficulties regarding the check until 13 days after she
deposited it.
In its Brief, Walker Bank and Trust Company
implies that the recovery in this case by :Miss :Madsen
somehow will undermine the purposes of the Uniform
Commercial Code and place unreasonable burdens on

16

collecting banks. This "Pandora's Uox" argument rings
hollow when one is reminded that the circumstances
smTomHling this check are entirely unique. It is further
important to note that even the Uniform Commercial
Code, in establishing where losses should lie in ordinary, common check transactions, places a burden on the
depositing hank for losses caused by a forged endorsement. "rhile this does not require a bank in every instance to examine an endorsement, clearly the Code
provides that it is not an unreasonable burden for a
bank teller to turn a check over to examine whether or
not it has been endorsed. Regardless of this fact, however, the uncontroverted testimony in this case establishes that the teller did, in fact, turn the check over
at the time of collection. l\Ir. John Doherty, Assistant
Yice- President and Assistant l\I anager of the Sugarhouse Branch of 'Valker Bank and Trust Company,
testified that the large endorsement of 'V alker Bank
in the center of the check is an item which is applied
to checks when they are sent as a collection item. l\Ir.
Doherty further testified that this stamp is applied
manually by the collection teller that handles the item.
(R. '219-222). Therefore, this testimony establishes
without question that an endorsement of \Valker Bank
was stamped by the teller manually on the back of the
check before the check left the Sugarhouse Branch of
\\Talker Bank for collection. The teller, accordingly,
had occasion to turn the check over, at which time the
absence of any endorsement would have been evident.
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A final matter with regard to \Valker lfank's liability is its argument that the 13ank is precluded from
liability because Miss l\ladsen may have retained a
cause of action against Darrell Hafen. With this argument, the Rank avoids the obvious fact that no loss
would have occurred without the Bank's negligence,
an<l it is difficult to see how 'Valker Bank can complain
because the Respondent brought an action on the basis
of the negligence of the Defendant 'Valker Bank and
Trust Company.
There is, therefore, ample evidence to support the
jury's finding that Walker Bank and Trust Company
was negligent in accepting and forwarding the subject
check without an endorsement; and it is inconceivable
that the bank can escape liability by alleging that it
handled the subject check in the same manner as the
vast majority of ordinary checks for which no unusual
or extradordinary circumstances are involved.
'\TALKER BANK CANNOT Ll~IIT ITS LIABILITY TO THE RESPONDENT BY
VIRTUE OF TlIE BANK'S RIGHT TO
CHARGE-BACK A DISHONORED CHECK.
If '\Talker Bank had not negligently accepted and
forwarded the subject check without an endorsement,
the check would have been paid, :1\liss .Madsen would
have suffered no loss, and no dispute would have
arisen. However, despite a jury verdict that the bank
was negligent, Walker Bank now argues that it can
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escape the consequences of its own negligence by relying on provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
which allow a collecting bank to charge-back a customer's account upon the dishonor of a check for which
"provisional credit'' had been granted.
This argument concerning a collecting bank's right
to charge-back, however, does not meet the issues of
this case. The issue is not whether the Bank may charge
back ~Iiss ~Iadsen's account. The Bank reversed the
credit entry on :Miss ~ladsen's savings account in December 1969, and the Respondent does not dispute the
validity of that action. The issue, rather, is whether
~Iiss ~Iadsen can recover the amount of her losses incurred because of the Bank's negligence, without which
the charge-back would never have been necessary. The
Uniform Commercial Code makes it clear that the
Bank is subject to liability for its negligence even
though it had the right under the Code to charge back
the account upon learning of the dishonor of the subject check.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-212 (1953), a
collecting bank which has made a provisional settlement
with a customer's account has the right to charge-back
a customer's account in the event the check is dishonored
or otherwise not paid. Subsection 4 of that Section further provides:
( 4) The right to charge-back is not affected
by
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(a) prior use of the credit given for the item;
or
( b) failure by any bank to exercise ordinary
care with respect to the item but any bank
so failing remains liable. (Emphasis added)
Official Co<le Comments to this section explains
the reason for this provision:
The rule of subsection ( 4) relating to
charge-back (as distinguished from c]aim for
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of
the nonpayment, and of the person ultimately liable for nonpayment. Thus charge-back is
permitted even where nonpayment results
from the depository bank's own negligence.
Any other rule would result in litigation based
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other
checks of the customer, with potential damages far in excess of the amount of the item.
Any other rule would require a bank to determine difficult questions of fact.

***

It is clear that the charge-back does not
relieve the bank from any liability for failure
to exercise ordinary care in handling the item.
The measure of damages for such failure is
stated in Section 4-103 ( 5) .
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Clearly, the purpose of this co<le prons1on is to
protect a hank from pyramiding liability which the
hank could possibly face because of non-payment of
checks which a customer might draw on the assumption
that the first item was credited to his account. In effect,
the Code limits the bank's liability only to the check
which was negligently handled. Contrary to the Appellant's argument, this provision does not erase 'V alker
Uank's liability on the subject check which the jury determined was negligently accepted, processed and forwarded.

THE THL\L COURT \VAS NOT IN ERROit
IN REFUSINCi TO INSTRUCT 'l'IIE JURY
ON TH~~ ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
"Talker Uank alleges that the Trial Judge was
in error in not instructing the jury regarding contributory negligence. There is no question in this case, howe\·er, that this decision of the Trial Court was correct
because reasonable m:nds could not differ that the negligence of \V alker Bank was the sole proximate cause
of the Respondent's losses.
The general rule in this case is that the issues of
contributory negligence and proximate cause are most
often questions of fact for the jury, except in the case
where reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to
these questions. See e.g., Hindrnarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs
Foodlincr, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968).
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The following facts regarding this case, however,
make the Judge's failure to instruct the jury on contributory negligence not only reasonable, but necessary:
A. The teJler removed the subject check totally
from the control of :Miss :Madsen in order to make the
confirmatory telephone call to Draper Bank and Trust
Company; and the check was never returned to such a
position that :Miss l\Iadsen could have endorsed the
check. (R. 183-186).
B. The statement by the officer of the Bank at
the time the check was taken for collection that :Miss
Madsen should instruct the teller to call Draper Bank
and Trust Company, the officer's indication that the
teller would take care of matters for .Miss l\:1adsen, and
the action by the teller following the telephone call to
Draper Bank and Trust Company, all gave implicit
assurances to l\:1iss :Madsen that the Bank would ensure
that all necessary actions would be taken by the Bank
to ensure that the check would be handled with all due
care.
C. The teller at \Valker Bank and Trust Company actually turned the check over at the time she
stamped Walker :Bank's endorsement on the check (R.
219-222), thus making it evident to her, as agent for
the Bank, that the check had not been endorsed by :Miss
l\Iadsen.
D. In specifying burdens of losses in connection
with ordinary check transfers~ the Uniform Commercial
Code provides for a burden of loss in connection with
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a forged endorsement to fall upon the collecting hank,
thus recognizing the natural presumption that a collectmg bank examines endorsements on checks.
In its Findings of Fact, the Court determined that
the negligence of \V alker Ilank and Trust Company
was the sole proximate cause for the Respondent's
damages in this case ( R. 126), and the Appellant presumes that the Court relied on the doctrine of "last
clear chance" in reaching this conclusion. \Vhile the
possible applicability of the "Last Clear Chance"
doctrine was discussed by the parties and by the .Judge,
there is no statement in the records nor in the Findings
of Fact that the Court was relying either partially or
solely upon a last clear chance doctrine in its failure
to instruct the jury regarding contributory negligence.
Indeed, the Appellant, at page 13 in its brief, states
that the Court "apparently" applied this theory. As
it has been demonstrated, the Court was justified solely
on the basis of the eYidence in this case in submitting
the question of negligence to the jury without the .issue of contributory negligence.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court did base its
decision, in whole or in part, on a last clear chance doctrine, there is no indication that this was error. The
ordinary situation in which the last clear chance doctrine is applicable is in personal injury actions in which
the Defendant has the best opportunity to avoid an
accident even though the Plaintiff is contributorily
negligent. There is no reason, however, that the doc-
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tri11e is applicable solely to actions i1wo1Ying physical
injury. vVhile Respondent is not aware of any precedent for or against the application of a last clear chance
doctrine to the type of case before this Court, there is
authority for the application of the doctril1e to situations other than actions involving personal injury. In
Theurer 'l'. Jlolland Furnace Co., 124 F.2<l, 494 (10th
Cir. 1941), the Plaintiff, a l_,ewiston. Utah, resident,
brought an action to recover property damages by fire
caused by Defendant's negligent installation of a furnace, and appealed the trial court's denial of recovery
based upon a special jury verdict which found the
Plaintiff contributorily negligent. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, among other reasons because ample evidence existed showing that Defendant's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the fire although the Plaintiff's negligence was existent at the
time of the fire. vVhile the Court did not find the last
clear chance doctrine applicable in this case because
there was no jury finding that the Plaintiff's negligence was concurrent with the Defendant's negligence,
the Court recognized the applicability of the doctrine
to negligence involving inanimate property. The Court
said:
The last clear chance doctrine finds its
most frequent application in actions for the recovery of damages for death or personal injuries. But it has been applied in cases involving inanimate property; and ordinarily when
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applied in such a case, it makes culpable the
damage or destruction of property where the
one causing the damage or destruction could
through the exercise of reasonable care have
avoided it, even though the owner of the property \Vas guilty of negligence in placing or
permitting the property to be in a place of
danger. 124 J;-..2d at 499 (Citations omitted).
In 11liller v. St. Louis Public Service Company,
375 S.,V. 2d 641 (l\Io. 1964), the Plaintiff brought
action for damages to his automobile without pleading
any personal injuries. The St. Louis Court of Appeals
said:
But in view of [the I-Iumanitarian Rule's]
origin and application we cannot agree that
only injury to the person will justify the negation of the defense of contributory negligence.
It certainly is not correct as to last chance
cases. After all, as pointed out by Parmele in
92 A.L.R. 47~ .55 "*** the donkey whose demise was the occasion of the decision in Davies
v. l\Iann *** was a chattel and not a person."

* * ** *
In short, courts in l\Iissouri and elsewhere have from its inception applied the last
chance rule (the source of our true humani- ·
tarian doctrine) to an action where no personal
injuries were involved and the only recovery
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was for damages to a chattel. 375 S.W.2d at
645 (Emphasis added) .

*****
In further discussing Missouri's "true humanitarian doctrine", the court said:
[\V]e can see no logical reason why it
should not apply to an action for an injury to a
chattel as well as to one for personal injuries.
If the doctrine proceeds upon precepts of humanity and of natural justice, why should not
the same consideration govern in both cases?
Is it humane or just to damage or destroy a
chattel when the injury may have been safely
avoided? We think not, and are of the opinion
that both logic and justice compel the uniform
application of the doctrine to both situations.
375 S.,V. 2d at 645-6.
Indeed, if the doctrine of contributory negligence
applies to this case, as the Appellant argues, there is
no logical reason why the last clear chance doctrine
would not also apply, since the application of the doctrine arises only after a finding of contributory negligence. Indeed, the loss by .Miss .Madsen of $5,500.00
because of Walker Bank's negligence in this case is
equally as much a loss as the loss of a $5,500.00 building or a $5,500.00 automobile. The dearth of authority
with regard to the application of the last clear chance
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doctrine to commercial transactions evidently is attrilmtable not to the fact that the last clear chance
doctrine is inapplicable, hut that circumstances have not
previously arisen in which possible concurrent negligence existed in a commercial transaction. Indeed, in
this situation where an agent of the Bank removed the
subject check completely from the control of the Respondent, manually stamped another endorsement on
the check, and was in position to ensure that an endorsement was on the check when it went for collection,
even if the Respondent \Vere negligent, 'V alker Bank
and Trust Company certainly had the "Last Clear
Chance" to avoid the damage.
In- Reece v. Proctor, 26 Utah 2d 219, 489 P.2d
1267 ( 1971), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the
Last Clear Chance Doctrine is applicable to a situation
where Plaintiff's posit;on of extricable peril has arisen
from his own negligence only if the Defendant actually
knew of Plaintiff's extricable peril." 26 Utah 2d at
221 (citations omitted). There is no question in the case
now before the Court that the teller had actual knowledge that the check was not endorsed when she had oc·
casion to look at the back of the check as she stamped a
manual endorsement of the Bank.
Despite the general rule in Utah that the questions
of contributory negligence and proximate cause are jury
questions, this Court certainly recognizes the fact that
a sufficient volume of proof may be adduced to justify
the trial judge's withholding these questions from the
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jury. There are certainly more than adequate evidence
and other factors in this case justifying the Judge's
determination that the negligence of Walker Bank was
the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiff's loss.
If the Judge committed any error in his instructions to the jury. it would have been the Judge's jury
instruction Number 9- in which he stated that the Court
found the Plaintiff negligent in failing to endorse the
check. Indeed, the great potential that this statement
had to prejudice the jury against :Miss :Madsen in its
determinations placed an additional obstacle upon the
Respondent which she ordinarily would not have faced.
Accordingly, the Trial Judge, in effect, placed an additional bur<len upon the Plaintiff, and to the advantage
of 'V alker Bank, in obtaining Judgment against the
Defendant. The fact that the jury, despite the enormous potential prejudicial effect of that jury instruction, still determined that Walker Bank was negligent
further emphasizes the overwhelming evidence of the
Bank's negligence.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this case more than adequately justifies the determination by the jury that
\V alker Bank and Trust Company was negligent in
accepting and forwarding the subject check without an
endorsement. As this Court has consistently held in reciting the standard rules of appellate review, the presumptions are in favor of the findings and judgment
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of the Trial Court, and evidence is reviewed in the light
most favorable to them. Sec e.g., Seegmiller v. 1Vestcrn
11/en, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 (1962); Oclerich v. Oclerich, 15 Utah 2d 409, :393 P.2d 799 (1964).
In addition, the bank cannot escape the liability caused
by its own negligence on the basis that the Bank had a
right to charge-back the Plaintiff's account, or that the
Plaintiff's remedies were limited by the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code is designed to be flexible, to expand and enlarge in accordance with customs and usages, and to facilitate commer·
cial transactions.
In addition, no issue existed upon which reasonable
minds could di ff er, other than the fact that Walker
Bank was negligent in accepting and forwarding the
subject check and that this negligence was the sole prox·
imate cause for the loss in this case. Therefore, the Trial
Judge did not commit error in failing to instruct the
jury on contributory negligence.
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment of
the Trial Court should be affirmed.
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